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 The Impact of the Political Cycle on House Prices: 
The Australian Experience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In several countries, high house prices have emerged as a significant social and 
economic issue. This exploratory study examines if house prices can be linked to the 
political cycle, specifically at election time, as governments realise homeowners 
represent a large voter base and house price movements will influence their voting 
intentions. To examine this relationship, the research utilizes 40 years of quarterly 
Melbourne house price data to examine the relationship between the movement in real 
house prices one year before and after local (State government) and national (Federal 
government) elections.  
Over the last four decades, Melbourne quarterly real house prices increased by 1.24% 
(annualised 5.05%). One year before an election, on average, the quarterly real house 
price increased by 1.21% Federal and 2.33% State. This compared to one year post 
election of 0.84% Federal and 0.60% State. At State government election time, 
depending on the political parties, there is a divergence on house price movement. As 
this research clearly identifies major variations in house price performance around 
election time, residential property decisions should make reference to the political cycle. 
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The Impact of the Political Cycle on House Prices:      
The Australian Experience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Clearly housing is more than a unique and valuable investment asset class. It is a key 
component of society wellbeing, in providing shelter and as a source of economic 
activity. As housing is an important component of a country’s prosperity, controlling the 
various aspects of housing is clearly a core long-term government mandate. 
In acknowledging government’s responsibilities for housing, the type and timing of 
policies across various levels of government can have far reaching effects on house 
prices. The extent of the government policies can be illustrated by examining the 
structure of the property market, with reference to the Figure 1 established three-market 
model which shows the relationship of the property, space and capital markets.  
Figure 1 
Property Market Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted: Archer and Ling 2007 
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Figure 1 illustrates governments’ influences across the property, space and capital 
markets. Government policy examples which can impact on house prices are as follows: 
i. Space market (Demand) 
       - Population policies (quotas on overseas migration) 
       - First time home buyers, incentives 
       - Opportunities for overseas owners to purchase residential properties 
ii. Capital market (Finance) 
       - Monetary policies (money supply, government bonds) 
       - Changes in property taxes (negative gearing, transaction tax - stamp duty)  
       - Regulations that impact on alternative asset classes 
        - Changes in superannuation policies (in an indirect way) 
iii. Property market (Property market conditions and supply) 
       - Release/rezoning of new residential land 
       - Changes in planning policies (housing density)  
       - Building regulations (sustainability agenda) 
In detailing government housing policies, policy timing and implementation can be used 
to manage and stimulate the housing market. The impact of these policies on house 
prices could be gradual or immediate. As home owners represent a large percentage of 
the voter base those policies implemented close to an election may influence their voting 
intention. If a link can be established, future research on house price movement may 
relate less to traditional property cycle features and more to the political cycle. 
The purpose of this research is to study the behaviour of house prices under various 
national and local political environments. This can be achieved by examining real house 
price performance over time for a specific residential property market. For this research 
Melbourne house prices was used as a representative case study. In grouping house 
price movement before and after elections, the impact of the political cycle can be 
compared to long term real residential property returns.  
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It should be noted that this research is not intended to endorse particular political parties, 
but rather to illustrate an approach for evaluating the impact of the political cycle on 
house prices. Similarly, it is outside the scope of this research to examine specific 
political factors which have impacted house prices. 
Following this introduction, Section two provides a literature review on housing and 
political cycles. Section three details the selected residential property market data with 
national (Federal) and local (State) political elections and the research methodology. 
Section four provides the empirical findings and the implications. The last section 
provides the concluding comments.   
 
2. Literature Review    
 
Economic theory has evolved, with major milestones providing new ways of thinking 
about the nature and theory of managing economic markets. Work by Marx (1867), 
Keynes (1936) and Friedman (1962) have introduced new concepts that have shaped 
economic strategies. 
Importantly, Keynes (1936) acknowledged the role of government to use all powers at 
their disposal to influence aggregated demand. Governments have available fiscal 
measures including changes in tax rate and spending alongside monetary measures 
associated with the management and supply of money. 
In providing the tools to manage the economy, government actions may be politically 
motivated to assist in the election of governments. Nordhuas (1975) presented the 
“Political Business Cycle” whereby suggesting government policies can manipulate the 
economy for electoral gain. These have been identified in three key areas: 
i. Macroeconomic outcomes: economic growth, lower inflation and lower 
unemployment etc  
ii. Beneficial rewards: voter tax breaks etc 
iii. Monetary policy: money supply and interest rates (in some countries interest rates 
are set independently by an appointed organisations, for example: Bank of 
England, Reserve Bank of Australia).  
Source: Ladewig (2008) 
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In detailing government strategies that can affect the political business cycle, there is 
criticism that the literature is often theoretically and empirically weak surrounding these 
key areas (Drazen 2000, Keech 1995 and Suzuki 1991).  
Contrary to the debatable links to the economy, research, particularly in the US, has 
coupled the political business cycle to investment asset classes. The relationship to 
equity and bond markets is centred on the performance of the asset classes, with 
reference to the political parties that were in power. The research provides conflicting 
evidence as to which political party provided overall better returns (Powell et al 2007, 
Ramchander et al 2009, Santa Clara and Valkanov 2003). 
For Australia and New Zealand, Anderson et al (2008), extended the political cycle 
literature by considering the links between governments and the equities, bonds, and 
property markets. The findings suggest that all asset markets are affected by the 
inflationary effects of government policies. These differential inflationary patterns have 
consequences for investment markets, with property offering a natural hedge to inflation. 
The study did note that the differences in nominal returns, real returns and market risk 
premiums for the property market were insignificant across the Australian Federal 
government parties. 
Alternatively, Abelson et al (2004), looked to explain real house prices movement over 
the long term (1970-2003). Significantly, the research discovered a broad range of real 
house prices determinants (inflation, unemployment, mortgage rates and the supply of 
housing) all which are affected to a greater or lesser degree by government policies.   
Berry and Dalton (2004) likewise commented on the security of a “bricks-and-mortar” 
investment being supported in the past and continued to be influenced by government 
housing and social policies. The persistence of government policy interventions can 
change housing market outcomes with a range of effects, some being unintended and 
some contradictory.   
In summary, many house price drivers are linked to government macroeconomic 
policies, which are made within a political framework. Consequently, in this environment, 
housing outcomes, although difficult to validate, can be an important election vote winner 
as home owners represent a large voter base. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 
Across Australia, determinants of the residential property markets can vary with local 
influences. For example in spring 2009, both the Perth and Brisbane residential property 
markets were performing above other State capitals, as these cities are associated with 
the booming resource sector (ANZ 2009).  
In looking at a specific housing market, State and Federal political cycles can be 
compared to residential property market movement. In Melbourne, the Real Estate 
Institute of Victoria collects and publishes established median house prices. Combined 
with an extended database from BIS Shrapnel a quarterly 1970 to 2009 Melbourne 
median house data series was created. Figure 2 details the Melbourne median house 
price over the last 40 years. 
Figure 2 
Melbourne Median House Prices: 1970-2009 
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Source: REIV 2010, BIS Shrapnel 2009 
Figure 2 illustrates the movement in Melbourne median house prices. The quarterly 
house price movement represents 2.65% (annualised 11.05%). The level of movement 
varies over time with substantial growth occurring during the last decade, particularly 
over the last 12 months.  
In detailing Melbourne median house price movement, annualised Melbourne inflation 
ranged -0.4% to 17.7% over this time period. The changes in inflation would impact on 
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comparing different time periods. Therefore the research examined real house price 
movement with inflation removed. 
The democratic political system in Australia comprises three tiers of government. Key 
political decisions are at Federal and State levels, with Local government generally 
being responsible for community services. The elections for Federal and most State 
governments are held on a three yearly basis with compulsory voting for those over 18 
years of age. 
A break down of the Australian political system and the government responsibilities is 
shown in Table1.  
Table 1     
Australian Government Responsibilities for the Economy 
Level of government  Economic Infrastructure Social Welfare 
Commonwealth 
Government 
- Aviation 
- Telecommunication 
and post  
- National highways 
- Tertiary education 
- Public housing (shared) 
- Health facilities (shared) 
State Government - Roads (rural, urban, 
local) 
- Railways 
- Ports 
- Electricity supply 
- Dams, water, 
sewerage 
- Public transport (train, 
bus) 
- Education institutions 
- Childcare facilities  
- Community health facilities 
- Public housing (shared) 
- Sport and recreational 
facilities  
- Cultural facilities  
- Libraries  
- Public order and safety 
Local Government - Roads (rural, urban, 
local) 
- Sewage treatment  
- Water supply and 
drainage 
- Electricity supply 
- Childcare centres 
- Libraries 
- Community centres 
- Nursing homes  
- Recreational facilities  
- Open spaces 
            Source: Higgins et al, 2007  
The Australian political system is dominated by two parities, Liberal (Conservatives) and 
Labor (Democrats). Table 2 and Table 3 show the respective Federal and State 
Governments and the election dates. To coincide with the quarterly property data, the 
election dates are shown on a quarterly basis.  
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Table 2 
Federal Government and Election Details 
Prime Minister 
Party in 
government 
Election 
Quarter 
Assumed 
Office 
Retired 
from Office 
Period of 
service 
(Quarters) 
John Gorton Liberal Party*   Dec-68 Mar-71 13 
   Dec-66      
   Sep-69 Sep-69 Mar-71 5 
William McMahon Liberal Party* Mar-71 Dec-72 7 
Gough Whitlam Labor Party   Dec-72 Dec-75 12 
   Dec-72 Dec-72 Jun-74 6 
   Jun-74 Jun-74 Dec-75 6 
Malcolm Fraser Liberal Party*   Dec-75 Mar-83 29 
   Dec-75 Dec-75 Dec-77 8 
   Dec-77 Dec-77 Sep-80 11 
   Sep-80 Sep-80 Mar-83 10 
Bob Hawke Labor Party   Mar-83 Dec-91 35 
   Mar-83 Mar-83 Dec-84 7 
   Dec-84 Dec-84 Jun-87 10 
   Jun-87 Jun-87 Mar-90 11 
   Mar-90 Mar-90 Dec-91 7 
Paul Keating Labor Party   Dec-91 Mar-96 17 
    Dec-91 Mar-93 5 
   Mar-93 Mar-93 Mar-96 12 
John Howard Liberal Party*   Mar-96 Dec-07 47 
   Mar-96 Mar-96 Sep-98 10 
   Sep-98 Sep-98 Dec-01 13 
   Dec-01 Dec-01 Sep-04 11 
   Sep-04 Sep-04 Dec-07 13 
Kevin Rudd Labor Party   Dec-07 - 8 
* Coalition government.     
 
Table 2 details the elected Australian Prime Ministers for the past 40 years. The three 
yearly electoral cycle has produced 16 elections over the period leading to 7 changes of 
government. The shortest period of government was the William McMahon lead 
government (20 months), compared to John Howard lead government of over 10 years, 
having been re-elected three times. 
The Victorian State Government and election dates are show in Table 3.
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Table 3 
Victorian State Government and Election Details 
Premier  
Party in 
government 
Election 
Quarter 
Assumed 
Office 
Retired 
from Office 
Period of 
service 
(Quarters) 
Henry Bolte  Liberal Party*   Jun-55 Sep-72 69 
    Jun-55       
    Jun-58       
    Jun-61       
    Jun-64       
    Mar-67 Mar-67 Jun-70 13 
    Jun-70 Jun-70 Sep-72 12 
Rupert Hamer  Liberal Party   Sep-72 Jun-81 35 
     Sep-72 Jun-73 3 
    Jun-73 Jun-73 Jun-76 12 
    Jun-76 Jun-76 Jun-79 12 
    Jun-79 Jun-79 Jun-81 8 
Lindsay 
Thompson  
Liberal Party   Jun-81 Mar-82 3 
John Cain  Labor Party   Mar-82 Sep-90 32 
    Mar-82 Mar-82 Mar-85 12 
    Mar-85 Mar-85 Sep-88 12 
    Sep-88 Sep-88 Sep-90 8 
Joan Kirner  Labor Party   Sep-90 Sep-92 9 
Jeff Kennett Liberal Party*   Sep-92 Sep-99 28 
    Sep-92 Sep-92 Mar-96 14 
    Mar-96 Mar-96 Sep-99 14 
Steve Bracks   Labor Party   Sep-99 Jun-07 31 
    Sep-99 Sep-99 Dec-02 13 
    Dec-02 Dec-02 Dec-06 16 
    Dec-06 Dec-06 Jun-07 2 
John Brumby  Labor Party   Jun-07 - 10 
* Coalition government.     
Table 3 shows that for the last 40 years, there have been 16 Victorian State elections 
with 8 Premiers. The shortest period of government was the Lindsay Thompson lead 
government of 9 months, whilst Robert Hamer was in power for over 9 years and re-
elected four times.  
3.2 Methodology   
To examine the relationship between the political cycle and house price movement, the 
data was initially examined using descriptive analysis over each decade of the past 40 
years. In addition, the performance during each elected Federal and State political party 
was examined over the time period. 
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In analysing the performance of the political parties, the political cycle can be examined 
using the performance of Melbourne house prices one year before and one year post 
election. An important consideration while interpreting the results is that the data only 
accounts for governments that have served more than 18-month post election period.  
In testing the robustness of the results, the analysis compared different performance 
periods over the dataset. Statistical significance tests provided inconclusive evidence 
that the means of the two groups were statistically different. It is possible that any house 
price movement and the political cycle relationship are simply due to co-movements with 
external factors, for example, global financial crisis and natural disasters. 
 
 
4. Results 
The first step was to review the descriptive statistics for the Melbourne residential 
property market over 10-year intervals. This is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Melbourne Real House Prices Descriptive Statistics  
Quarterly Data: Jan 70 – Dec 09 
 
1970's 1980's 1990's 2000's Total 
Mean 0.89% 1.54% 1.13% 1.28% 1.24% 
Median 0.32% 1.41% 1.00% 1.63% 0.84% 
Standard Deviation 6.41% 9.22% 5.91% 5.83% 6.91% 
Kurtosis - 0.03 0.41 -  0.87 - 0.31 0.57 
Skewness 0.49 0.01 -  0.21 0.13 0.11 
Range 26.20% 42.44% 21.40% 24.12% 42.44% 
Minimum -10.10% -18.99% -10.40% -10.15% -18.99% 
Maximum 16.10% 23.45% 11.00% 13.98% 23.45% 
Table 4 shows that over the last four decades, the average quarterly percentage change 
in Melbourne real house price ranged from 0.89% to 1.54%. The 1980’s provided strong 
returns, being 30% above the long-term trend. House price movement over the last 
decade was very close to the long term average.  
In each decade, low skewness and low kurtosis readings demonstrate a flat bell curve 
as illustrated by high standard deviation readings above 5%, with a wide data range of 
between -10% and 10%. This illustrates that movements in residential property market 
can be substantial and unrelated to movement in inflation. 
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The descriptive statistics for Melbourne house price performance under different Federal 
and State political parties is shown in Table 5. 
Table 5  
Melbourne House Prices Descriptive Statistics  
Federal and State Political Parties  
Quarterly Data: Jan 70 - Dec 09 
 
Federal 
Labor 
Federal 
Liberal State Labor State Liberal Overall 
Mean 1.31% 1.18% 1.40% 1.07% 1.24% 
Median 1.69% 0.69% 1.74% 0.52% 0.84% 
Standard Deviation 7.51% 6.43% 7.32% 6.49% 6.91% 
Kurtosis 0.58 0.48 0.87 0.07 0.57 
Skewness 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.11 
Range 42.44% 34.48% 42.44% 33.35% 42.44% 
Minimum -18.99% -16.74% -18.99% -15.62% -18.99% 
Maximum 23.45% 17.74% 23.45% 17.74% 23.45% 
Count 72 89 83 78 160 
Table 5 details a relatively narrow quarterly house price range, 1.07% to 1.40%, for the 
Federal and State political parties. This represents a relative difference of ± 16% from 
the long term average of 1.24%. The difference in median values and to a lesser extent 
the standard deviation would suggest that Liberal Federal and State governments have 
consistently less volatile returns to that of Labor Federal and State governments. 
Although across the Federal and State political parties, similarities appear to be evident 
with low skewness and low kurtosis readings. This data tends to illustrate no significant 
variation / differences in the Melbourne house price performance either under the Labor 
Party or Liberal Party rule at both Federal and State government levels.    
Table 6 compares the Melbourne house price performance during the first year of 
government by the Labor Party and the Liberal Party after each election at both Federal 
and Victoria State government level.  
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Table 6 
Federal and State Governments First Year Election Performance  
Melbourne House Prices: Quarterly Data 
First Year Federal Labor 
Federal 
Liberal 
Federal 
Total 
State 
Labor 
State 
Liberal State Total 
Quarters 24 32 56 24 24 48 
Mean  0.77% 0.89% 0.84% 1.25% -0.04% 0.60% 
Std. Dev 9.27% 6.01% 7.50% 7.56% 6.14% 6.85% 
Table 6 illustrates nominal differences in Melbourne house price performance during the 
first year of Federal Labor and Liberal governments. The average quarter-on-quarter 
percentage change in Melbourne house price during the first term of Labor governments 
was 0.77%, slightly lower than 0.89% recorded by Liberal governments. However, at 
Victoria State government level, there is a notable difference, with Melbourne house 
prices recording a mean of 1.25% during the first year of Labor government, which is 
significantly higher than -0.04% recorded under the first year of Liberal rule. The major 
difference in performance at State government level may related to expenditure policies 
as Anderson et al (2008) argued that left-of-centre governments are more concerned 
with controlling unemployment than right-of-centre governments. 
The Melbourne house price performance one year before an election at both Federal 
and Victoria State government level is shown in Table 7.  
Table 7 
Federal and State Governments Last Year Election Performance  
Melbourne House Prices: Quarterly Data 
Last Year Federal Labor 
Federal 
Liberal 
Federal 
Total 
State 
Labor 
State 
Liberal State Total 
Quarters 20 32 52 20 24 44 
Mean  1.23% 1.19% 1.21% 3.21% 1.59% 2.33% 
Std. Dev 6.23% 7.25% 6.81% 7.45% 7.46% 7.46% 
Table 7 shows similarities in Melbourne house price performance at Federal and State 
Labor and Liberal governments one year before an election. At the Federal government 
level, the average quarter percentage change in Melbourne house price during the last 
year of a Labor government was 1.19%, slightly lower than 1.23% recorded by Liberal. 
At Victoria State government level, the Melbourne house price recorded a mean of 
3.21% during the last year of Labor government, being close to double the 1.59% 
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recorded under the last year of Liberal rule. These figures are well above the long term 
1.24% average for quarterly Melbourne house price performance.  
For the entire data set, the quarterly performance of Melbourne house price can be 
compared by examining the first and last year of the elected governments. This is 
exhibited in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Federal and State Governments First and Last Year Performance  
Melbourne House Prices: Quarterly Data 
Mean Federal Labor 
Federal 
Liberal 
State 
Labor 
State 
Liberal 
First Year  0.77% 0.89% 1.25% -0.04% 
Last Year  1.23% 1.19% 3.21% 1.59% 
Overall  1.08% 1.18% 1.20% 1.07% 
Table 8 illustrates how Melbourne house prices perform much better in the year before 
an election, compared to the first year after an election. For the Federal Government, 
there appears to be nominal difference between the parties. Melbourne house prices 
overall performance was close to 50% better in the last year of government compared to 
the year after the election. 
In analysing the results, there appears to be a strong case that political parties see 
house prices as a key consideration prior to an election. This is evident in both Federal 
and State governments. These pre-emptive policies by governments to support /stabilise 
house prices on the short-term could reverberate at a latter stage to inflated house 
prices. The long term effect on economic growth could be acutely suppressed by 
affordability issues across the residential property markets. 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
This study represents a systematic empirical examination of the political cycle influence 
on Australian house prices. By examining the real long term performance of Melbourne 
established house prices to Federal and State government elections, the impact and 
timing of their policies can be reviewed.   
Over the last four decades, quarterly Melbourne house prices increased by 1.24% 
(annualised return of 5.05%). There appears to be nominal variance in Melbourne house 
price movement between the elected Federal and State Labor and Liberal parties. The 
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key variation in house price movement is at election time. Melbourne house prices 
performance is significantly better the year before an election compared to one year post 
election. This is evident at both Federal and State government level, at varying degrees. 
In recognising policy makers’ active management of house prices for political gain, the 
short-term benefits of appealing to a large number of voters may conceal underlying long 
term flaws in the residential property market. Leaving these issues unaddressed could 
be more complex than often perceived. 
These findings identify an array of potential areas of study. By placing political cycles as 
part of the residential property research agenda, those that are linked to the residential 
property markets should include the political framework as part of the decision making 
process. 
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